Home · Current version v0.8.6

# Changelog

User-facing release notes for the Front of House Client Portal. Operator and security-design detail lives in an internal document, not on this page.

## 0.8.6 - 2026-11-19

### Fixed

- Production builds no longer download fonts from the network: the display and body fonts are self-hosted (this shipped with 0.8.4), so builds in CI are deterministic. This release lines up the version after the fonts change landed with the earlier releases.

## 0.8.5 - 2026-11-16

### Security

- The sign-in library and its core and database-adapter packages were updated to versions that include the published fixes for two sign-in advisories. Login, two-factor authentication, and password-reset flows are unchanged in application code.
- A leftover vulnerability-baseline entry for an advisory already fixed by that upgrade was removed, so a regression would be reported if an older sign-in library came back.
- The web framework was updated to the latest 15.5 patch release, which includes the fixes for three framework advisories published on November 19.

## 0.8.4 - 2026-11-16

### Changed

- Re-applying the same connector configuration at the same version is now treated as a no-op success: the portal confirms it, leaves stored state unchanged, and still records the attempt. An older version, or the same version with a different configuration, is still rejected as a conflict.
- Each configuration payload is bound to this portal and to the request that carries it. A payload issued for a different destination, or presented with a different request, is rejected.
- A successful configuration change and its audit record are written together. If the audit cannot be written, the change is not kept.
- Version numbers that do not fit the stored column are rejected.
- These public notes no longer include internal route, token-claim, or environment-flag names.
- The app self-hosts its display and body fonts, so the production build no longer downloads fonts from the network at compile time.
- Portal database tables now have row-level security enabled as defense in depth. The application's own database role continues to work as the table owner; row-level security is not forced on that role.
- The portal keeps its own allowlist of per-tool access levels (`read`, `write`, or `destructive`). A configuration label that tries to lower a destructive tool is ignored, and the tool still requires the destructive mode and a step-up confirmation. If the same tool is listed more than once while building that allowlist, the higher access level is kept.
- Two first-time configuration pushes that arrive at the same moment are now recorded as a conflict, not as an internal error.
- The database migration history table now has the same row-level security treatment as the other portal tables. The application's own database role still works as the table owner.

### Unchanged

- Staff and service-token access to the portal is unchanged. The harness connector stays off until it is explicitly enabled. Tool names and the existing non-harness access paths are unchanged.

## 0.8.3 - 2026-11-15

### Fixed

- A fresh database can now be migrated so that it matches the application's schema. Older migrations stay compatible with databases that already applied them, and a follow-up migration fills in any remaining tables, columns, indexes, and foreign keys.
- A local/CI check applies the migrations to a throwaway database and fails if they drift from the schema.

### Unchanged

- No production, hosting, or database-provider cutover was included in this release.

## 0.8.2 - 2026-11-15

### Added

- The portal can accept a signed connector configuration from the harness. Until a configuration is accepted, harness tool calls stay fail-closed. Configuration stays off until the harness connector is explicitly enabled. Destructive tools still need a step-up confirmation.
- Public pages, the login page, and the admin and dashboard layouts show the app version from the package manifest, linked to this changelog.

## 0.8.1 - 2026-11-15

### Changed

- When the harness connector is enabled, a harness bearer token on the connector is verified after staff access checks. A bad token is rejected and is not allowed to fall back to another path.
- An optional setting can require a harness token for tool calls. It stays off by default so existing dashboard and bot access is unchanged.

### Security

- A transitive XML-parser dependency was updated. No application API change.

### Unchanged

- Existing access paths when no harness token is sent, the hosting deployment gate, tool names, and no delete tools.

## 0.8.0 - 2026-11-03

### Added

- Optional harness bearer-token authentication for the connector, off by default. Tokens are signature-checked, audience-bound, short-lived, and protected against replay. Tool access is limited to the scopes in the token. A static map translates harness scopes to portal tools.

### Unchanged

- Existing staff and service-token access paths, the hosting deployment gate, the current tool names, and no delete tools.

## 0.7.3 - 2026-11-01

### Added

- Scripts to copy Postgres data and stored files to a new environment, with dry run as the default, row-count checks, and redaction of secrets from output.
- A migration runbook covering setup, cutover, connector tests, and rollback. Production secrets stay in the production environment only.

## 0.7.2 - 2026-11-01

### Added

- A storage adapter for documents, photos, social images, and Help videos. Local disk remains the default off the hosted platform. An S3-compatible bucket can be selected when configured. Existing file URLs keep working. On the hosted platform, local-disk storage is refused so files are not written to ephemeral disk.
- File, help-video, and social-media downloads go through the adapter. Social-media responses are not cached publicly.

### Changed

- Help-video uploads use smaller chunks to stay under the hosted platform's request-body limit.
- The Help assistant's hourly question cap is stored in the database so it holds across serverless instances.

## 0.7.1 - 2026-11-01

### Security

- Service tokens on the hosted platform use the same opt-in and hostname checks as the connector. Forbidden proxy headers, attestation, replay, token hash, and scope checks still run after that gate.

## 0.7.0 - 2026-10-29

### Added

- The database schema can use a direct connection URL for command-line migrations, with a documented fallback on the existing server. Hosting cutover notes were added.

### Security

- The connector on the hosted platform is opt-in and stays unavailable until it is enabled and the required access configuration and hostname checks are in place. Self-hosted behavior is unchanged.
- The web framework and a validation library were updated for published advisories. One remaining transitive advisory is tracked with a documented baseline.

## 0.6.3 - 2026-10-22

### Added

- Manage Users has a Resend Invite button on each row, with confirmation and visible sending, success, and email-provider error states.

### Security

- That action is audited for browser admins and service tokens, including the acting admin's email. A missing actor email is refused before a new setup link is created. A failed audit write refuses the action.

## 0.6.2 - 2026-10-22

### Security

- Access-token key clients are cached per team. The anonymous connector rate limit is applied before token verification.
- Debug routes were removed from the service-token catalog.
- The loopback gateway rejects an access email that is not on the connector allowlist. The hosted platform still keeps the connector unavailable until it is explicitly enabled.
- The Discord bot must send its access-client credentials on every call.

## 0.6.1 - 2026-10-22

### Security

- Sessions carry a version that is bumped when a user is removed, so the session ends on the next database check.
- The webview disconnect action is no longer a service-token route. Additional client IDs on a project are add-only for service and connector callers.
- The loopback gateway rejects a request with no access token after writing an audit row. The hosted platform refuses service tokens unless they go through the intended path.
- Access tokens are verified with a single allowed algorithm. Replay nonces and connector rate limits are stored in the database and deleted when they expire.
- Each connector tool has a typed argument schema. CI typecheck fails when a new type error appears. The test script runs the whole suite.
- Secret scanning no longer allowlists the example environment file. A historical key is ignored by fingerprint until it is rotated. Git history is left as it is.

## 0.6.0 - 2026-10-22

### Security

- The admin connector is served on the self-hosted portal behind Cloudflare Access. The portal verifies the access assertion itself. Allowlisted emails act as themselves. A service-token assertion also needs a hashed portal service token and a signed actor header with replay protection.
- Discord tokens stay bound to the IT mailbox via the Discord bot. IP headers are not trusted. Rate limits are per actor, per service token, and a small anonymous cap.

## 0.5.1 - 2026-10-22

### Security

- Domain onboarding through the connector is create and update only; cancel actions are rejected.
- Debug and destructive connector tools were removed. A failed post-call audit update is recorded and the call is refused.
- The portal accepts a shorter signed actor payload from a paired gateway revision.

## 0.5.0 - 2026-10-22

### Added

- An admin connector whose tools are generated from the service-token route catalog, one per non-delete route, with that route's read or write scope.
- Acting identity is a signed actor email derived from a Cloudflare Access assertion.
- Discord service tokens bind server-side to the IT mailbox and audit accordingly.
- Connector audit rows are written before the tool runs. A failed audit insert refuses the call. Gateway and auth rejections are audited too.

### Security

- No delete, soft-delete, webview disconnect, or connection-removal tools. Null update fields and archived or deleted status values are rejected. Additional client IDs are add-only.
- Callers present a hashed service token through the loopback gateway. Common proxy IP headers are not trusted. The connector stays unavailable on the hosted platform until it is explicitly enabled.

## 0.4.0 - 2026-10-22

### Security

- Removed delete and soft-delete scopes. No service token can be minted with those capabilities.
- The route catalog no longer lists delete or soft-delete routes. Those handlers accept an admin browser session only.
- Connection removal no longer accepts a write-only connection scope.

### Changed

- Includes gateway hardening from the stacked branch: the peer is bound into the signed payload, the gateway listens on loopback only, and request bodies are capped.

## 0.3.1 - 2026-10-21

### Security

- Service tokens require the loopback gateway with signed attestation; no peer inference from the Host header or client IP headers.
- Common proxy headers are rejected on bearer requests.
- The dashboard audit user cannot use interactive login.
- Every service-token attempt is logged.
- GitHub Actions runs tests, secret scanning, and vulnerability scanning.

## 0.3.0 - 2026-10-21

### Added

- Full Mac Dashboard service-token coverage for admin and admin-capable API routes.
- Resource scopes for projects, users, requests, domains, documents, notes, meetings, webview, connections, and more.
- A complete route table in the service-token documentation.

## 0.2.0 - 2026-10-21

### Added

- Service tokens for loopback and private-LAN admin client APIs (Mac Dashboard).
- Allowlisted admin client updates with audit logging.
- A CLI to mint service tokens, and a timing-safe check for scheduled-job credentials.